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Abstract
The creation of interface standards enables competition at the level of
components, rather than in complete systems, and consumers often
benefit from component competition. Nevertheless, the standard
setting process can be manipulated to achieve anticompetitive ends. The
authors consider the conditions under which a standards consortium
could impose anticompetitive burdens on the market and examine several
strategies such a consortium might employ to achieve anticompetitive
objectives. They present a new strategy – one-way interface standards –
and discuss the conditions under which it can be anticompetitive.
1 Introduction
Complementary devices in a complex technological system must com-
municate through interfaces to interoperate successfully. In systems
that involve communications and computing functions, interfaces are
connections through which signals pass. The devices on both sides of an
interface (e.g., the microprocessors and a disk drive, or the PBX [that is,
the private branch exchange] and the central office switch) must be
designed so that they make the correct physical connection, send the
correct signals to each other, and correctly interpret the signals
received. We refer to the formal physical and signaling details as the
interface specification.
Communications and computing functions are featured in a much
wider variety of systems than those we think of as primarily telecom-
munications or computers. For example, automobiles have sophisti-
cated controller systems in which multiple components communicate
with each other. Medical devices often perform sophisticated computa-
tion. At the least, our analysis applies to any system through which
information flows through electrical, photonic, or other electromagnetic
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signaling. We also expect the general principles to apply to interfaces
in other (non-signaling) technologies, though we have not studied
such systems.
An interface stands (physically or logically) between two (or more)
separate components. Thus, for an interface specification to succeed, it
must be adopted by at least one manufacturer of the components on each
side of the interface. When an interface specification is published,
adopted, and implemented by at least one different firm manufacturing
each of the affected components, we refer to it as an interface standard.1
In this article, we develop three related ideas: (1) technologies can
compete as individual components or as complete systems; (2) interface
standards are important determinants of component-level competition;
and (3) the standard setting process can be manipulated to distort
component competition. Our primary original contribution is to iden-
tify a specific strategy – which we call one-way interface standards –
that standards consortia can use to manipulate a standard setting
process to achieve anticompetitive ends.
Competition and consumers often – but not always – benefit when
interface specifications are standardized and openly published. For
example, if competing firms can design and manufacture system com-
ponents that correctly interoperate, then consumers (or systems inte-
grators that then sell to consumers) can mix and match components
from different manufacturers to get the set of components that offers
the best combination of price and performance. Nevertheless, consu-
mers also may benefit when competition is for complete, incompatible
systems, because there may be more incentive for innovation or more
efficient adoption and rejection of new technologies.
Most interface specifications are developed by firms participating in the
relevant industries. There are several different configurations of industry
participants that might work together to create a standard. For example,
* A group may be composed of several manufacturers of each compo-
nent. In some such cases, a relatively open process is used, in which a
membership organization (with or without government sanctioning)
accepts any qualified participant that manufactures either (or both)
1 Terms such as ‘‘standards’’ and ‘‘open’’ are used in various ways in the literature.
In this article, we use ‘‘standard’’ for a specification that is published, and we use
‘‘open’’ to refer to the public nature of the standard. We specifically do not use
‘‘open’’ to describe the copyright or licensing status of the standard, such as it is
often used when discussing open source technologies.
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of the complementary components and through a formal process the
organization jointly develops the specification. In other cases, mem-
bership is limited.
* A group may be composed of firms that manufacture the component
on one side of the interface. For example, automobile manufacturers
might agree on a specification for attaching tires to wheels without
the participation of tire manufacturers.
* A single firm that manufactures products on one or both sides of the
interface may specify a standard. For example, once required to do
so by the Federal Communications Commission, AT&T announced
specifications for attaching customer premises equipment (CPE) to
its network.2 Microsoft also unilaterally announces the specifica-
tions of applications programming interfaces (APIs) for software
programs to communicate with its operating systems.
It is conventionally assumed that openly published standards lower
the barriers to entry in a market because potential entrants can design
components that interoperate with existing complements if they adhere
to the standard. The standard setting process, however, can be manipu-
lated to create or raise barriers to entry. Just as with a price-setting
consortium (that is, a cartel), a standards consortium may be able to
harm competition when its membership characteristics satisfy condi-
tions for market power and barriers to entry.3 There are two conditions
sufficient to anticompetitively manipulate a standards process: (1) the
consortium must include firms with sufficient market power to ensure
industry adoption of the standard, and (2) membership and decision-
making control must be restricted in a manner that excludes viable
potential competitors.4
2 The rules requiring AT&T to permit others to attach CPE to its network and to
publish the interface specifications necessary to do so, were developed by the
courts and the Federal Communications Commission in a series of landmark
decisions: Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States (1957); Use of the Carterfone
Device in Message Toll Telephone Service (1968); Second Computer Inquiry
Decisions (1980 and 1981); and Computer & Communications Industry
Association v. Federal Communications Commission (1982, 1983, 1984).
3 The European Commission (1987) recognized these characteristics in X/Open
Group.
4 Many standard setting groups have two levels or groups of membership. One
group controls (sets) the standard and the other group has an advisory and/or
testing role. For example, the USB 2.0 Implementers Forum has Promoter
Members, who are allowed to vote on decisions, and Participant Members, who
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When a standards consortium has the potential to exercise market
power, various strategies may have anticompetitive consequences.
These strategies include delaying publication of the standard to gain a
first-mover advantage; creating standards that require other firms to
use royalty-bearing intellectual property (e.g., a patent owned by a firm
in the standards consortium); and creating one-way interface
standards.5
To the best of our knowledge, the last strategy – one-way interface
standards – has not previously been described in the economics
literature. In an industry with complementary system components
that interoperate, component manufacturers on both sides of the
interface require specifications for the physical and/or logical con-
nections that enable the components to interoperate. In general, it is
necessary to publish the specification of both sides of the interface
protocol for manufacturers on either side to use the standard.
However, through creating a blind or a cut-out – in the form of an
extra technology layer – a consortium can publish the information
necessary to manufacture compliant components on one side of
the interface without releasing the information necessary to manu-
facture components on the other side. We name this strategy one-
way interface standards. Such standards facilitate competition for
one component, but harm competition for the other, complementary
component.
Whether one-way interface standards harm consumers overall turns
on the same issues well known in the trade-off between mix-and-match
and systems competition. Our contribution is to show how an interface
standards consortium can move the boundary that separates systems
from mix-and-match competition.
are allowed to participate in the discussions but are not allowed to vote. See the
group’s bylaws at www.usb.org/data/retail/usbif_bylaws.pdf.
5 In the penultimate section of this paper, we present three detailed examples of
standards consortia that apparently have employed these tactics to use standard
setting processes for anticompetitive gain. One example involves the JEDEC
consortium and its creation of a DRAM standard subject to the patents of
Rambus, which participated in JEDEC; another is Intel’s specification of the
Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP) advanced graphics standard; and the third is
the development of the Universal Serial Bus (USB) 2.0 and EHCI (Enhanced Host
Controller Interface) interface specifications to implement high-speed serial com-
munications with desktop computer peripherals.
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2 Benefits and costs of component competition
When interface specifications are standardized and non-proprietary,
component competition – that is, competition between multiple man-
ufacturers of a given component in a system – can thrive. However, it is
not given that component competition is necessarily superior to sys-
tems competition. We briefly describe the benefits and costs of compo-
nent competition.
2.1 Benefits from component competition
Competition on price and performance
When interface specifications are published, more firms can enter the
markets for individual components, and the greater entry results in
more competition on price, performance, and quality of the component
in question (Economides 1988; Matutes and Regibeau 1988). In con-
trast, when interfaces are not public, competition is between incompa-
tible systems (i.e., combinations of components), rather than between
mix-and-match components. Systems competition results in increased
product differentiation among components of a particular type: they
are compatible with different systems. If there is not much demand for
the ensuing variety, it may serve primarily to divide the market. Thus,
spurious differentiation can lead to higher prices and may not provide
offsetting gain from variety (Farrell and Saloner 1986a). Component
competition avoids such spurious product differentiation, and thus can
lead to lower prices and higher quality.
Scale efficiencies and lower production costs
By increasing the size of the potential market, public interface stan-
dards may enable firms to realize efficient scale and learning economies
(Hemenway 1975). This may explain why Apple Macintosh hardware
typically costs more than comparably performing PC (personal com-
puter) hardware.6
6 Scale economies might explain the price difference for some components that use
different interfaces even if the interfaces adhere to published standards. For
example, in 2001, PC Connection (a leading component retailer) listed eighty-
seven add-in video cards for Intel-based PCs. Mac Connection (owned by the
same company) listed only five add-in video cards for Apple Macintosh
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Network externalities
For many products, consumers benefit the more other users there are of
the same (or a compatible) product. For example, several standards for
mobile telephones are in use. Telephone companies in the United States
largely adopted TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) multiplexing,
but some adopted CDMA (Code-Division Multiple Access) technol-
ogy. Europe and most of the rest of the world adopted GSM (Global
System for Mobile Communications), which uses TDMA. Consumers
with GSM phones benefit from being able to use their phones as they
move from country to country.7 Some US users have started to benefit
from this network externality, as providers deploy new GSM networks.
To do so, however, customers typically must first purchase more
expensive multi-mode phones to make domestic calls outside the rather
limited footprint of the GSM networks and then use the different
frequencies for GSM that are employed by other nations. If there is a
single standard with component competition, then the number of users
will be larger and consumers may obtain greater benefits from the
network externalities.
More innovation and variety for components
When interfaces between complementary components are standard-
ized, a firm making one component in a system faces a larger potential
market than in a market with multiple proprietary interfaces. If inter-
faces are proprietary, a firm that innovates can only sell its component
to the portion of the market that uses the particular system with which
its component works. When the potential payoffs are larger, it is
worthwhile for small, innovative, new firms to incur the risks and
costs of entry, thereby enhancing competition. For example, while
maintaining compatibility with the x86 architecture interface stan-
dards, firms other than Intel pioneered low-power microprocessors
for mobile computers; Cyrix’s MediaGX microprocessor spawned
computers. In addition, prices for the PC components were lower. For example,
the ATI Tech Radeon 32MB DDR (double data rate) video board for a PC
was $166 with an AGP interface. See http://www.pcconnection.com/scripts/
productdetail.asp?product_id=214468. The same card for the Macintosh is
$209–$240 with an AGP interface. See http://www.macconnection.com/scripts/
productdetail.asp?product_id=219741.
7 One of the authors observed Martin Cave, while in Australia, use his UK phone to
call someone with an Australian phone who was sitting in a cubicle 10 feet away.
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the sub-$1,000 PC market;8 AMD (Advanced Micro Devices) and Intel
have been leapfrogging each other in a race for the fastest processors;
and so forth.
Reduced risk of stranded investments
When interfaces are standardized, consumers will have confidence that
they can buy upgraded components that will work with their systems
and that these components will continue to work if they purchase a new
base system. For example, consumers can add larger and faster hard
drives, improved monitors, scanners, and other devices to their base
computers (Porter 1985).
2.2 Costs from component competition
There are also some potential costs to consumers from component
competition based on open standards. The costs we discuss in this
section are not (necessarily) associated with anticompetitive behavior:
They can occur in competitive markets. These costs are a consequence
of the complementarities inherent in complex technological systems.
With complementarities, consumers may be better off with production
of systems consisting of components that connect through proprietary
interfaces. In such cases, there may be sufficient benefits from competi-
tion between systems to outweigh the foregone benefits of component-
wise competition.
Reduction in system design variety
Systems competition, with the resulting differentiation between system
architectures, may provide benefits by increasing variety. When inter-
faces are proprietary, a firm that wishes to enter with a new, innovative
design in one component may find it necessary to develop an entire
system. The result may be an increase in variety of systems. The entry of
the NeXT computer in the late 1980s may be an example. NeXT
introduced a new operating system that took greater advantage of the
8 The MediaGX combined a microprocessor, memory controller, graphics accel-
erator, and PCI (peripheral component interconnect) interface on a single chip. At
the time, competing offerings would have required at least a processor plus the
north bridge of a chipset to match this functionality. Microprocessor Report
(1997a) attributes the MediaGX’s success with driving Intel to finally breach
the $106 price floor it had long maintained for its mainstream processors.
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object-oriented programming model than did any other desktop oper-
ating system. NeXT also produced its own hardware on which to run
this operating system, introducing innovations in digital signal proces-
sing, raster-oriented (Display Postscript) screen output, mass storage
(magneto-optical drives), and other features.9
Network externalities
When network externalities are significant, socially undesirable out-
comes may occur in a market with open standards and component,
rather than systems, competition. For example, when there are already
many users of a given standardized system, the incentives to innovate
and develop a better system may be insufficient. Even if a firm does
develop a better system, consumers may find it too costly to switch
(in part because they do not believe that enough other users will
switch). In a market with competition among several incompatible
systems, entry by a new, innovative system may be easier than in a
market with a single common set of standards. This problem, which
can lead to sub-optimal innovation, is known as excess inertia (Farrell
and Saloner 1986a; Katz and Shapiro 1994).
2.3 Summary: systems versus mix-and-match competition
Manufacturers of complementary components need to know interface
specifications in a system so that their components correctly connect
and communicate with the other components. With open interface
standards, many firms can make compatible components on both
sides of the interface, and thus component competition will be viable.
As was previously described, there are both benefits of component
competition for consumers and, in some situations, offsetting costs.
In some industries, these offsetting costs are sufficient enough that
consumers are better served by systems competition, which is marked
by proprietary interfaces and components that work only with specific
matching complements.
For the most part, the history of the x86-compatible PC industry has
been marked by component-based competition; the availability of open
9 The NeXT operating system became the basis for Apple’s OS/X operating system,
and thus has contributed substantially to Apple’s ongoing ability to put some
competitive pressure on Microsoft and Intel.
238 Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Janet S. Netz
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/SAPP/2-PROOFS/3B2/052186450XC07.3D 239 [231–259] 31.7.2006 4:27PM
standards has been credited with the high rate of innovation, the
variety of low-cost, high-performance products, and the overwhelming
success of the PC architecture against closed systems, such as the Apple
Macintosh and various RISC-based (reduced instruction set computer-
based) systems. Both systems and component competition have been
dominant in different parts of the telecommunications industry.
On the basis of economic theory alone, we cannot conclude that
component-based competition and open interface standards are always
best for consumers and the economy. Yet, when open standards
are preferred, it is usually on the assumption that they benefit compo-
nent competition. We now identify strategies through which the stand-
ard setting process can be manipulated to harm competition and
consumers.
3 Anticompetitive manipulation of interface standards
Collusive agreements between competitors to fix prices or divide mar-
kets are generally illegal. Indeed, under the Sherman Antitrust Act,
collusion is per se illegal: it is not necessary to prove that the agreement
causes harm to consumers; rather, harm is presumed. However, collu-
sive agreements among competitors to establish interface standards are
not per se prohibited, and in fact are both common and encouraged by
policymakers.
The different stance toward standards agreements follows from the
presumption that their effects are primarily pro-competitive. Yet, when
there is a combination of firms that together have power in at least one
of the markets for components on the two sides of an interface, they
may be able to use the process of setting interface standards to increase
or maintain market power. Doing so can ultimately harm consumers
and society.
To harm competition, a standards consortium must satisfy the two
usual conditions. First, it must have market power and be protected by
barriers to entry in order to successfully exercise that market power.
Thus, for it to be possible to harm competition, a consortium needs to
include firms with sufficient market power in one or both of the
component markets to ensure widespread adoption of the standard.
Second, to protect against competitive dilution, the consortium needs
to restrict membership and decision-making control in a manner that
excludes viable potential competitors. If not – that is, if any competent
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and interested firm could participate and if the decision process was not
biased so that a subset of the members could exert effective control –
then it would be hard for the consortium to implement anticompetitive
strategies.10
The European Union antitrust body discussed precisely these condi-
tions in its X/Open Group decision (European Commission 1987). It
was concerned with market power because the case involved a stan-
dard setting group of computer firms that were each of considerable
size. The Commission also noted that it was possible for the members
to exclude competing firms from membership. The Commission con-
cluded that ‘‘an appreciable distortion of competition . . . may result
from future decisions of the Group’’ (¶34).
Of course, that a consortium of firms with the potential to exclude
competition agrees to set standards does not imply that consumers and
competition will be harmed. We now describe some strategies with
anticompetitive effects that such consortia might employ.
3.1 Charging a toll
One way in which an interface specification consortium can harm
component competition is to design royalty-bearing intellectual prop-
erty into the standard. Suppose one firm in the consortium holds a
patent on a technology that is useful but not essential for the interface.
That is, the interface could be designed without the patented technol-
ogy and be equally efficient. The patent holder, however, might induce
the consortium to specify that the patented technology be used for the
interface, and, as a result, would be paid royalties for its use. As an
inducement, the patent holder might share the rents by offering
consortium members a reduced or zero royalty, ensuring that rivals
of the consortium’s members will have higher costs than consortium
members.
Sometimes a patent holder might be able to deceive a consortium
unilaterally into including its patented technology in a specification.
Often there are long delays between the date a firm files a claim and the
10 Although restricted voting can enable a consortium to harm competition, it may
not be necessary to force democratic participation and fair voting rules to protect
competition. It may be sufficient to require that all information shared by
consortium members be made simultaneously available to all other competent
and interested firms.
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grant of the patent. The consortium may not realize that a technology
written into a specification is covered by such a ‘‘submarine’’ patent.11
If the patent is granted after the specification is released and adopted as a
standard by the industry, the patent holder may successfully raise its
rivals’ costs through the royalties it demands. Later, we will discuss the
Rambus cases, in which its rivals claimed Rambus employed this strategy.
3.2 Withholding or delaying information
A second strategy through which an interface specification consortium
can harm component competition is by withholding necessary interface
information from potential rivals for a short or long period, thereby
rendering a so-called open standard effectively proprietary (Farrell and
Saloner 1992). Withholding necessary information raises rivals’ costs
(thus raising the prices to end users) and may deter entry (or hasten
exit) altogether (Matutes and Regibeau 1996). In particular, if crucial
interface information is withheld for long enough, a potential rival will
be forced to develop a complete system, in which it controls the inter-
faces, and then to compete on a systems basis. Thus, the consortium
may have colluded to exclude component competition. The creation of
the Universal Serial Bus (USB) 2.0 standard, which we describe below,
is a possible example of this strategy.
3.3 One-way interface standards
Another potentially anticompetitive strategy is for a consortium to
design a standard to facilitate competition in components on one side
of an interface while restricting competition in components on the
11 There are many cases in which patent claimants exploited Patent Office rules to
intentionally delay the granting and publication of their patents. The Lemelson
machine vision patents are a well-known example, in which delays were created
by filing a series of continuation and divisional patent applications that claim
priority from the initial patent application. The Federal Circuit recently ruled
that a patent may be unenforceable if the patent applicant unreasonably delays
prosecuting the patent (Symbol Technologies Inc. v. Lemelson Medical,
Educational & Research Foundation 2002).
US patent law was recently amended by the American Inventors Protection Act
of 1999 to limit submarine patents. Claims filed after November 29, 2000 will
automatically be published eighteen months after they are filed, even if the
review process is not complete.
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other side of the interface. We call this a one-way interface standard. As
we noted earlier, we have not seen this strategy previously identified in
the literature.
Implementing a one-way interface standard is not straightforward.
Since a standard specifies both sides of an interface, it might seem that
the consortium need merely withhold the specification information for
one side of the interface. In fact, it is the nature of interface standards
that manufacturers of components on both sides need all of the infor-
mation about both sides of the interface. To understand this requires a
bit more detail about interface standards.
Consider a simple interface (see Figure 7.1). We have illustrated the
communications part of an interface standard, known as the protocol.
An enormous variety of technologies (including any system that
employs communications or computing) depends on interfaces that
send signals between components. The protocol specifies the language
for the signaling, including a syntax and vocabulary. In Figure 7.1 we
show a piece of CPE and a communications switch. The CPE sends
queries and directives to the switch; the switch responds. Likewise, the
switch queries the CPE, which in turn responds. The protocol specifies
the permissible queries and the responses that can be generated to each
query. If the CPE complies with the specification, it knows what
messages it can send and what responses the switch can give. If the
CPE did not know the responses the switch could give, then it could not
be programmed to make use of those responses. Likewise, a compliant
CPE knows what queries it can receive and what responses it is
expected to give.
From the example, it should be evident that the components on both
sides of the interface must know the full specification. The CPE must
know not only its own permissible queries and responses to the switch,





Figure 7.1. Telecom interface protocol.
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possible to publish only one side of the specification and design com-
ponents on that side.
How, then, can a standards consortium design a one-way interface
standard? The basic idea is to create a ‘‘cut-out’’ or a ‘‘blind’’ – to insert
an additional structure between the two components. We call this
structure a translator. Now the interface specification between one
component and the translator can be published, but the interface
specification between the translator and the other component is treated
as proprietary and is not published. Manufacturers on the open side
can manufacture compliant components that communicate with the
translator, but non-member manufacturers on the other side cannot
make their components communicate with the translator.
To illustrate, consider the following example of how the protocol in
Figure 7.1 would break down if both sides were not published. Imagine
that the CPE is programmed to communicate in English. However,
the switch is programmed to communicate in another language, and
the CPE does not know what language the switch is using, nor how
to speak it. Clearly, the CPE and the switch cannot interoperate
successfully.
Now introduce a translator (Figure 7.2). The interface protocol
between the CPE and the translator can specify that they speak
English to each other. The language spoken between the translator
and the switch can be kept secret. Anyone can manufacture compliant
CPE, but only those consortium members who know the secret lan-
guage spoken by the translator can manufacture switches.
There is a simple and reasonably familiar way to implement a one-
way interface standard, at least conceptually. The standard could
specify that the two components communicate via public key crypto-
graphy (PKC). In PKC communications, keys are created in pairs, one
called ‘‘public’’ and the other ‘‘private.’’ A message encrypted with the
public key can only be decrypted with the private key; likewise, a
Protocoll Protocoll
Figure 7.2. Telecom interface with translator.
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message encrypted with the private key can only be decrypted with the
public key.12
The following example illustrates how PKC can be used to imple-
ment one-way interface standards. The standard would publish a pub-
lic key and an algorithm that components on the public side could use
to encrypt messages sent to the private side, and to decrypt messages
arriving from the private side. Components on the private side would
need the corresponding private key to decrypt messages encrypted with
the public key and to encrypt messages that could be decrypted with the
public key. As long as the component manufacturers on the protected
side of the interface kept the private key secret, no other manufacturer
could make a component that could communicate with the public side
components.13
The effect of a one-way interface standard is to extend the boundary
of systems competition. Continuing with the example, the switch in
Figure 7.1 is a system. That is, the switch is a set of complementary
components that communicate with each other to collectively perform
services for users. To compete in switches, manufacturers need to
implement all of the features that switch users expect – in particular,
the ability to communicate with external components through speci-
fied interfaces. Thus, there is systems competition in switches. Suppose
that when a one-way interface standard is imposed, as in Figure 7.2, the
switch is on the proprietary side. Now, a potential competitor that
previously would have designed complete switch systems to compete
must design both the switch and the translator. That is, since the
specification between the CPE and the translator is public, potential
switch competitors can connect to CPE if they develop their own
translators that conform to the public CPE-translator standard. The
system boundary has expanded to include the translator device.14
12 Diffie and Hellman (1976) first proposed the PKC; the most widely used imple-
mentation is the RSA algorithm (Rivest et al. 1978).
13 It is unlikely that PKC would actually be used for this purpose for at least two
reasons. First, the private key would need to be hard-coded into the physical
components, and then it would likely be a straightforward matter for competing
firms to discover it. Second, PKC imposes substantial computational overhead,
and hence would not be practical for the many very fast, very short messages that
communications and computing devices exchange.
14 Notice that this strategy is similar to tying as a foreclosure strategy: A firm with
monopoly power over Good A requires consumers to purchase Good B if they
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Expanding the system boundary is a variation on raising rivals’
costs. It may be possible to design and market expanded systems
(that include proprietary translators), but it takes time and money to
do so. If the translator design is sufficiently costly or time-consuming,
or if it is protected by intellectual property, then firms excluded from
the standards consortium may find it very difficult to compete
effectively.
3.4 Timing is critical
Timing is a crucial element in the above strategies. In the communica-
tions and computing industries, technological innovation is so constant
and rapid that significant delays in time to market can mean the
difference between vibrant, successful competition and a persistent
pattern of dominance with minor fringe competition. Thus, none of
the strategies needs to be leak-proof or permanent. If the dominant firm
can impose the competitive disadvantages for as little as a few months
or a year, the effects on competition can be devastating. This is parti-
cularly so because the ongoing cycle of innovation gives the dominant
firm the opportunity to put its competitors ‘‘on the treadmill.’’ For
example, with one-way interface standards, a dominant firm could
introduce one translator after another, for each new or revised interface
that arises. Potential competitors would bear an ongoing stream of
higher costs and delays in getting to market.
The US Federal Trade Commission (hereafter, FTC 1999) makes this
point quite forcefully in its analysis of Intel’s conduct published along
with the consent decree entered into by Intel and the FTC:
The computer industry is characterized by short, dynamic product cycles,
which are generally measured in months. Time to market is crucial. Indeed,
the denial of advance product information is virtually tantamount to a denial
of actual parts, because an OEM [original equipment manufacturer] custo-
mer lacking such information simply cannot design new computer systems on
a competitive schedule with other OEMs. An OEM who [sic] suffers denial of
such information over a period of months will lose much of the profits it
want to get Good A. If demand is sufficient for Good A, this may harm competi-
tion in the market for Good B. For a Good B producer to effectively compete, it
may have to develop its own version of Good A so that it can offer consumers a
complete package of Goods A and B.
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might otherwise have earned even from a successful new computer model.
Continued denial of advance technical information to an OEM by a domi-
nant supplier can make a customer’s very existence as an OEM untenable.
The European Commission (1987, ¶32) noted the same concern in the
context of a standards consortium:
In an industry where lead time can be a factor of considerable importance,
membership of the group may thus confer an appreciable competitive advan-
tage on the members vis-à-vis their hardware and software competitors . . .
this advantage in lead time directly affects the market entry possibilities of
non-members.
That is, it is not necessary for a standard setting consortium to withhold
the interface specification standard forever for competition to be
harmed. If the member firms have advance knowledge of the standard,
they can bring compliant products to market before non-members, and
even a few months of lead-time can spell the difference between market
success and failure.
4 Examples of possible anticompetitive interface specifications
In this section, we examine three examples of possibly anticompeti-
tive interface standards in the computer industry. In one example, the
consortium incorporated patented information in a memory stand-
ard; in another, a monopolist established a one-way interface stan-
dard for graphics processors; and in the third, a consortium imposed
a one-way interface standard and gained competitive advantage by
delaying the release of necessary specification details for a peripheral
standard.
Before discussing the examples of standards consortia in the com-
puter industry, we briefly describe some relevant technological and
economic characteristics of microprocessors. By themselves, micropro-
cessors have little or no value to end users. Microprocessors can process
computational instructions, but they need software to deliver the
instructions. They also need a variety of other devices that assist in
performing the tasks that end users desire. For example, microproces-
sors need memory to hold data and instructions (which end users
demand in a variety of configurations, e.g., DRAM [dynamic random
access memory], hard disks, floppy disks, CD-ROM [compact disc-
read-only memory], etc.). Microprocessors need input and output
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devices (keyboards, scanners, microphones, cameras, printers, moni-
tors, voice and data network lines, etc.). For all of the above, the
microprocessors need communications pathways and devices that
manage the vast variety of complex and extremely fast high-speed
signals flowing among all of the various devices. In short, end users
demand computer systems, of which microprocessors are but one
component. The systems, in turn, are comprised of numerous compo-
nents. Between these components are a variety of interfaces.
In the microprocessor industry, many consortia exist to create stan-
dards for the interfaces between hardware devices that connect to a
PC’s microprocessor or to the microprocessor’s associated chipset.
Many of these consortia have closed membership, and the members
of the consortia both control the details of the interface standards and
have advance knowledge of the interface details, which provides con-
sortia members substantial lead-time in developing compatible
products.
Both systems and component competition occur in the computer
industry. When standards are proprietary, competition must take
place on a systems basis. An example is the current technology for
microprocessors and chipsets. In the mid-1990s Intel made the bus that
connects its microprocessor to chipsets proprietary. Since then, Intel-
compatible microprocessors and chipsets compete as a system against
AMD-compatible microprocessors and chipsets.15
When interface specifications are open and standardized, it is
possible for multiple firms to compete for the manufacture of a
given component for use in the same system. This is known as compo-
nent competition. An example is the competition among Maxtor,
Seagate, IBM, Fujitsu, and others to make and sell hard drives that
are used in PCs manufactured by Dell, Compaq, Vobis, Groupe Bull,
and others.
15 Intel making the bus proprietary and thus expanding the boundary of its
microprocessor system to include chipsets is an example of a one-way inter-
face standard. While the specifications to connect to the chipset from
components other than the microprocessor are publicly available, the speci-
fications to connect the chipset to the microprocessor are not publicly avail-
able and are also protected by intellectual property subject to restrictive
licensing.
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4.1 Inserting patents in standards: JEDEC and Rambus16
A possible example of using standard setting for anticompetitive gain
concerns standards for computer memory.17 The parties include
* JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, a standard setting organ-
ization. Membership is open to any company that manufactures
products or provides services related to electronics. One of its sub-
committees, JC-42.3, the Subcommittee on RAM Devices, develops
standards related to RAM. It published standards in November 1993
and again in 1999 (Alban 2004).
* Rambus, a designer/developer of ‘‘high-speed chip-connection tech-
nology.’’ This chip-connection technology is incorporated in mem-
ory chips. Rambus licenses technology; it does not manufacture
memory chips.
* Manufacturers of computer memory, including Hitachi, Hynix,
Infineon, Micron Technology, Samsung, and Toshiba.
The actions of Rambus, described in some detail below, have led to
many lawsuits. Rambus has been accused by the FTC of unreasonably
restraining trade, attempting to monopolize, monopolizing, and enga-
ging in unfair methods of competition in the market for SDRAM
technology in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.18 Memory man-
ufacturers have sued Rambus, with allegations of fraud and antitrust
violations (Miles and Shankland 2000). Rambus has filed suits against
most of the major memory makers alleging patent infringement
(Infineon, Micron, and Hyundai, which is now Hynix). A group of
standard setting bodies filed an amicus brief in support of Infineon,
arguing that Rambus concealed its intellectual property (Kanellos
2003a). Many of the cases are still active, but the most recent rulings
have tended to be in Rambus’ favor, interpreting the JEDEC bylaws as
16 The information in this section is primarily from the complaint filed by the FTC
in 2002, Fried 2001, Kanellos 2001, and Miles and Shankland 2000.
17 In particular, this incident involves the move from asynchronous DRAM (dynamic
random access memory) to synchronous DRAM (often called SDRAM) that
occurred during the 1990s. Some form of SDRAM is the most common memory
in computers today. RDRAM (or Rambus DRAM) and DDR DRAM (or double
data rate DRAM) are both forms of SDRAM.
18 In February 2004, an FTC administrative law judge dismissed the case; the FTC
is appealing the case (FTC 2004).
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not requiring disclosure on Rambus’ part.19 Of course, whether or not
JEDEC bylaws specifically required disclosure is immaterial to whether
Rambus actually concealed information in the standard setting process
with anticompetitive effects.
The allegations against Rambus are that they used participation in
the standard setting process to write their patents in such a way as to
ensure that the JEDEC-adopted SDRAM standards infringed on
Rambus’ patents. Rambus filed its first patent April 18, 1990. It
attended its first JEDEC meeting in December 1991, and joined
JEDEC in February 1992. Business documents show that as early as
1992, Rambus believed that SDRAMs infringed on its patents (Alban
2004). The JEDEC bylaws call for all participants ‘‘to inform the
meeting [of the standards-setting committee] of any knowledge they
may have of any patents, or pending patents, that might be involved in
the work they are undertaking’’ (JEDEC 2002, 18). When asked by
JEDEC representatives if Rambus had disclosures to make, in one
instance Rambus declined to make any such disclosures and in another
made limited disclosures regarding a single patent relating to a clocking
technology that differed from anything JEDEC was considering.20
Rambus stopped attending JC-42.3 meetings in December 1995, and
formally left the organization in June 1996. The letter formally with-
drawing its membership included a list of Rambus’ patents. Infineon
accused Rambus of using ‘‘informants’’ after Rambus withdrew from
JEDEC to learn of discussions of DRAM standards in order to rewrite
its patents to cover JEDEC standards (Kanellos 2001). Rambus filed
amended patent applications in 1997 to cover SDRAM technology;
these patents were awarded in 1999 and 2000. At that point, Rambus
began enforcing its patent rights against memory manufacturers.
Rather than using restricted membership as a means to achieve
anticompetitive ends, in the Rambus cases, the standard setting group
had open membership to anyone involved commercially in the indus-
try. Although restricted membership is sufficient for the potential to
manipulate, this condition is not the only one necessary to enable
19 In particular, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the FTC case against
Rambus (FTC 2004) and the Federal Circuit ruled largely in Rambus’ favor in
Rambus v. Infineon (Alban 2004).
20 In its defense, ‘‘Rambus has maintained that competitors knew about its patents
and product plans while SDRAM-related standards talks were going on at
JEDEC’’ (Kawamoto 2004).
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anticompetitive behavior. In the Rambus situation, the seller of the
technology allegedly withheld vital information about its intellectual
property throughout the standard setting process, adjusted its patent
filings to reflect the standards adopted by the group, and then enforced
its patents against the buyers of the technology once they had adopted
the standards that Rambus claimed infringed on its patents.21 Open
membership may not protect the standards process if one firm can
successfully deceive the other members about crucial property rights.
4.2 One-way interface standards: Accelerated Graphics Port
The Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP) is an example of a one-way
interface standard.22 The AGP has electrical specifications on one
side, between the AGP and the peripherals, and software specifications
on the other side, between the AGP and the chipset.
The AGP specification23 was developed by Intel with input from
various industry participants, including ATI Technologies (a leading
21 It is possible that, even had JEDEC known about Rambus’ intellectual property,
it would have adopted the same standards. However, JEDEC does have as one of
its goals to avoid using patented technology.
JEDEC standards . . . that require the use of patented items should be considered
with great care. (For the purpose of this policy, the term ‘patented items’ includes
items and processes for which a patent has been applied.) While there is no
restriction against drafting a proposed standard in terms that include the use of a
patented item if technical reasons justify the inclusion, committees should avoid
standardization that refers to a product on which there is a known patent unless
all the relevant technical information covered by the patent is known to the
formulating committee, subcommittee, or task group.
If the committee member indicates that the standard requires the use of
patented items, then the committee chairperson must receive a written assurance
from the organization holding rights to such patents that a license will be made
available to applicants desiring to implement the standard either without com-
pensation or under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free
of any unfair discrimination. (JEDEC 2002, Section 8)
22 The AGP Forum web page, which is no longer available, describes the AGP
interface as ‘‘a new platform bus specification that enables high performance
graphics capabilities especially 3D, on PCs at mainstream price points’’ (http://
www.agpforum.org/, accessed September 1, 2002).
23 The information and quotations in this paragraph are from the AGP Forum’s
website, at http://www.agpforum.org/. The AGP Forum existed until at least late
2002. As of today, the AGP forum web page is no longer available, and a search
of Intel’s web page does not find anything on the forum. We do not know the
exact date between late 2002 and mid-2004 when the forum became defunct.
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developer and manufacturer of graphics chips) and Cirrus Logic (‘‘a
premier supplier of high-performance analog, digital signal processing
[DSP] and mixed-signal chip solutions for consumer electronics’’). In
May 1996, Intel created ‘‘an open industry group,’’ the Accelerated
Graphics Port Implementors Forum. The goal of the forum was to
‘‘foster design and production of graphics hardware products and PC
systems’’ which comply with the AGP interface specification. Firms
could become members for $2,500 a year, with the benefits of ‘‘parti-
cipation in events and technical support subject to availability.’’ Intel
had the right to limit the number of participants or to discontinue the
program altogether and maintained unilateral control over the stan-
dard. As far as we could determine, no microprocessor or chipset
manufacturer other than Intel was part of the forum. This is a case in
which the standards consortium that implemented the one-way inter-
face standard is essentially a single firm (with input from others).
Intel made the electrical specifications public, which means that
firms can manufacture peripherals that will interoperate with AGP.24
‘‘[T]he AGP 1.0 specification consists of the necessary electrical and
signal information that will enable graphics hardware developers and
system OEMs to both design and use graphics controllers on the
graphics port’’ (Intel 1996). AGP-compliant PCs and graphics hard-
ware products were available by March 1997. Competition for these
products has been vital, in large part because the specification was
freely available.25
Innovation and competition on the chipset/chip interface side of
AGP (i.e., the interface that was not published) has not been so
dynamic. Intel, the owner of the specification, had AGP-capable chip-
sets out in mid-1997 that were compatible with Pentium II processors.
Other chip and chipset makers could not immediately manufacture on
their side of the standard because the software specifications were not
public. Instead, they had to invent around the software specifications.
Although it appeared that parties other than Intel were offering
AGP-compliant chipsets within about six months of Intel’s introduction
24 The AGP V3.0 Interface Specification, revision 1.0, September 2002, contains a
chapter on the physical layer specification, but not the software layer. See http://
developer.intel.com/technology/agp/downloads/agp30_final_10.pdf (accessed
May 11, 2004).
25 More precisely, ‘‘[t]he AGP specification will be licensed on a royalty-free,
reciprocal basis’’ (Intel 1996).
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of an AGP-compliant chipset, the appearances were deceiving.
First, the chipsets offered by third parties were not compatible with
Pentium II chips, which at the time were the high-end microprocessors
and were introduced in May 1997. Second, the chipsets did not work
properly. VIA Technologies and ALI offered chipsets that were com-
patible with Socket 7 Pentium chips by late 1997 or early 1998; these
chipsets were not compatible with Pentium Pro, Pentium II, and
beyond. VIA’s first supposedly AGP-compliant chipset crashed with
Cyrix microprocessors and the AGP 2x mode did not work (Tom’s
Hardware 1997).
As late as May 1999, HardwareCentral, an online news source ‘‘for
in-depth computer hardware info,’’26 reported that to use AGP
required a ‘‘motherboard with Intel’s 440LX PCI/AGP chipset,’’ a
chipset for Pentium II microprocessors (Risley 1999a). It was expected
that the 440LX chipset would be made available for non-Intel proces-
sors, and it was reported that Socket 7 motherboards that offer AGP
support using the VIA Apollo VP3 and the ALI Aladdin V chipsets were
‘‘beginning’’ to appear. HardwareCentral also reported in May 1999
that AGP was ‘‘on the road to becoming non-exclusive to the Intel
Pentium II and 440LS chipset’’ and that Cyrix was ‘‘working on
the MXi, which will . . . support AGP’’ (Risley 1999b). Not long after
that, however, Cyrix indefinitely postponed development of the MXi
(Slater 1999).
AMD offered an AGP-compliant chipset in August 1999 (AMD
1999), and VIA Technologies offered Pentium II-compatible chipsets
that were AGP compatible about the same time (Shimpi 1999).
Thus, Intel was the only supplier of AGP-compatible and Pentium
II-compatible chipsets for over two years after the AGP standard was
published. Transmeta x86-compatible microprocessor chips did not
support AGP until October 2003, and the chips were not marketed
in the United States until April 2004 (Sharma 2004), over seven
years after the AGP interface was developed. This lack of functionality
was something that ‘‘prevented the company from getting into
the mainstream notebook market’’ (Kanellos 2003b).27 In addition,
26 See www.hardwarecentral.com.
27 Nvidia produced the chipsets for Transmeta’s Efficeon processor (Kanellos
2003a).
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Transmeta’s ability to support AGP came at a time when AGP was
beginning to be replaced by PCI Express.
By implementing a one-way interface standard, Intel had a significant
time-to-market advantage. For over two years, it was the only company
offering chipsets that were AGP-compatible and Pentium II-compatible,
and the supposedly AGP-compliant and Socket 7-compatible chipsets
that were offered by third parties had essentially no impact on the
market. On the other side of the interface, competition was vibrant
and immediate, with AGP-compatible products becoming available in
the market by March 1997, just a few months after the standard was
published. In this example, standard setting encouraged component
competition on just one side of the interface.
4.3 One-way interface standards and publication
delay: USB 2.028
In this last example, we describe a consortium that has behaved in a
way that is consistent with two of our anticompetitive strategies:
Implementing a one-way interface standard and delaying the release
of information about the standard.
The USB is a standard for the microprocessor to communicate with
slow- and medium-speed peripherals such as mice, keyboards, printers,
scanners, and digital cameras. It defines an interface between a host
controller and the peripherals. The host controller, which can be an
independent physical device or be integrated onto the chipset, speaks
with the system software via the host controller interface. Thus, there
are two interfaces working together: the USB interface between the
peripherals and the host controller, and the host controller interface
between the host controller and the system software. As was previously
described, this is a situation with two devices – the peripherals and the
microprocessor (and system software) – separated by a ‘‘translator,’’
the host controller (see Figure 7.2).
USB 1.1 was originally developed in 1995. Two host controller
interfaces, OHCI (Open Host Controller Interface) and UHCI
(Universal Host Controller Interface), work with USB 1.1. UHCI is
Intel’s proprietary interface, and is available via a royalty-free, reci-
procal license for adopters of USB. Jointly developed by Compaq,
28 USB 2.0 is also marketed as Hi-Speed USB (see CNET News.com Staff 2001).
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Microsoft, and National Semiconductor, OHCI is an open standard,
available for download at http://www.compaq.com/productinfo/
development/openhci.html (Compaq 1997).
USB 2.0, which increases the speed of the peripheral-to-PC connec-
tion by forty times relative to USB 1.1, was completed in April 2000.29
USB 2.0 is compatible only with a new host controller interface, EHCI
(Enhanced Host Controller Interface), which is proprietary to Intel.
Version 0.95 of the EHCI was made public in November 2000, but
Version 1.0 was not released until April 2002, a full two years after the
USB 2.0 specification was published. The EHCI interface is not freely
available: Intel licenses it only in exchange for the grant of a royalty-
free license to Intel on the licensee’s related intellectual property.
A one-way interface standard was implemented because the host
controller interface, EHCI, is proprietary to Intel, while the USB 2.0
interface is an open interface. Peripheral manufacturers have the infor-
mation they need to produce USB 2.0-compliant peripherals and con-
sortium members have the information they need to produce USB
2.0-compliant chipsets and stand-alone host controllers. That is, the
consortium released the specification information necessary for makers
of complementary peripherals to implement their side of the USB 2.0
interfaces. The EHCI is required to implement the chipset/mother-
board side of the USB 2.0 interface. Only non-member chipset and
microprocessor firms are denied the information necessary to design
their products to meet the USB 2.0 interface specification.
The consortium has the characteristics that allow it to develop
standards with an anticompetitive impact. The USB Implementers
Forum has two membership classes: Promoter Members, who have
voting rights, and Participant Members, who do not.30 Promoter
Members must be engaged in research and development of the USB
specifications. The Board of Directors, made up of employees of
Promoter Members, has sole discretion to accept or reject applications
from other firms to become a voting member.31 To become a Promoter
Member, one must receive unanimous approval of the Promoter
29 A beta version was published in October 1999.
30 The USB Implementers Forum was incorporated as a non-profit organization on
January 18, 1999.
31 Jeff Ravencraft of Intel currently serves as Chairman and President of the Board
of Directors of the USB Implementers Forum; before him, the Chairman was
Jason Ziller, also Intel’s technology initiatives manager. Email communication
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Members; any individual Promoter Member has veto power over a
Promoter Membership application. Thus, the consortium satisfies one
of the criteria that enable a consortium to behave anticompetitively:
Membership is limited and current members control which firms can
become a member.
The voting members of the consortium are Intel, Compaq, Hewlett-
Packard, Lucent, Microsoft, NEC Technologies, and Philips.32 These
members created and controlled the interface specification standard for
USB 2.0.33 The consortium does not include any firms that produce
chipsets or microprocessors except for Intel. Intel has an opportunity,
then, to manipulate the standard setting process in such a way as to
advantage itself against other microprocessor firms (chiefly AMD) and
other chipset firms (e.g., VIA Technologies). The second criterion for a
standards consortium to have the potential to manipulate a standard
anticompetitively is that it must include firms with sufficient influence
to ensure that the standard is adopted. In this case, Intel and Microsoft
together have the ability to ensure industry-wide adoption of a
standard.
In addition to the one-way nature of the interface standard, consor-
tium members had a competitive advantage through early access to the
USB 2.0 and EHCI specifications. That is, any firm has been able to
build a peripheral that is USB 2.0-compliant, but only consortium
members have been able to build the system-side hardware. For exam-
ple, NEC Technologies announced that it had developed the world’s
first USB 2.0 and EHCI-compliant host controller on April 12, 2000,
fifteen days before the USB 2.0 interface was released and six months
before the preliminary version of the EHCI interface was released. In
August 2000, Lucent announced a host controller;34 and in May 2001,
Philips announced a host controller. Until May 2002, implementation
of USB 2.0 required the use of a host controller, a separate add-on
piece to the chipset. In May 2002, the first chipsets with integrated host
to the authors from Traci Donnell, USB-IF Administration, dated June 2, 2004,
and Intel 2002a.
32 The formation of the USB 2.0 Promoter Group was announced at the Intel
Developer Forum in Spring 1999. For USB 2.0, Hewlett-Packard, Lucent, and
Philips joined the original core firm behind USB 1.1 – Compaq, Intel, Microsoft,
and NEC Technologies.
33 The bylaws are available from http://www.usb.org/data/retail/usbif_bylaws.pdf.
34 We believe that Lucent did not succeed in manufacturing this host controller
until at least May 2001.
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controllers were announced. It was at this point that a non-member of
the consortium announced implementation of a USB 2.0 compliant
chipset or host controller.35
5 Conclusion
We have described the circumstances under which firms can use the
standard setting process in an anticompetitive manner. Anticompetitive
strategies include manipulating standards to include a firm’s patented
intellectual property; using information gained from within the consor-
tium to gain a time-to-market advantage; and creating one-way interface
standards. We believe our discussion of one-way interface standards is
new to the literature.
Each of these strategies can have the effect of reducing component-
based competition, and thus has the potential to harm consumer wel-
fare. Since systems competition can in some circumstances be better for
social welfare than component competition, it generally would be
prudent to examine the specific facts and economic conditions relevant
to a particular interface standard before concluding that the use of
these strategies by a standards consortium is harmful. Nevertheless,
recognizing the availability of these strategies to consortia demon-
strates that standard setting does not guarantee vital component-
based competition.
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